Soccer ball presenting a scoring system to prevent collusion.

Fair Play or Foul? The World Cup's Collusion Conundrum

"A simple rule change could eliminate the risk of teams conspiring for a mutually beneficial result in the group stages."


As the World Cup evolves, a looming threat to fair play has emerged: the increased potential for collusion between teams, particularly with the proposed introduction of three-team groups. While the current four-team format already presents some opportunities for strategic manipulation, the new structure significantly amplifies this risk.

Mathematician Julien Guyon has highlighted the core problem: three-team groups, which may be implemented as early as the 2022 or 2026 World Cup, incentivize teams to collude. Unlike the knockout stages, group play allows teams to strategically aim for specific results that guarantee advancement for both colluding parties, potentially at the expense of a third team.

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta proposes a simple yet effective solution to mitigate this growing risk: adjust the scoring system to reduce the incentive for draws and promote more decisive outcomes. By awarding points in a way that diminishes the value of a draw, the potential for collusion can be significantly curtailed, ensuring a fairer competition for all teams involved.

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World Cup Data at a Glance

Big Das says its database covers every World Cup, from the 1930 tournament in Uruguay through the most recent competition. Datahub describes coverage of men's tournaments from 1930–2022 and women's tournaments from 1991–2019, including matches, goals, squads, bookings, penalty shootouts and awards. Infodash says its systematization of FIFA-published data includes variables such as goals, cards and VAR use.

The Three-Team Group Risk

Research on groups of three warns that the two teams playing the last group match can know exactly which results will let them advance. A 2024 study says modifications to the format may significantly reduce collusion risk, proposing random tie-breaking based on goal difference together with dynamic scheduling. The available research frames these as risk-reduction measures, rather than a guarantee that collusion can be eliminated.

A Tournament Founded in 1930

History.com reports that the FIFA World Cup has been held every four years since 1930. History Collection says the first tournament took place in July 1930, when 13 nations gathered in Montevideo. The tournament's origin, therefore, was an event hosted in Uruguay with a 13-nation field.

The Problem with Three-Team Groups: Increased Collusion Risk

Soccer ball presenting a scoring system to prevent collusion.

In the current four-team group format, collusion is possible, but FIFA mitigates this by staging final group games simultaneously. This prevents teams from knowing the exact result needed in their game to advance at the expense of another team. However, with three-team groups, this becomes more challenging.

Three-team groups inherently mean fewer games, but they also create a proportionally greater number of scenarios where collusion becomes a viable strategy. Because matches will have to be played sequentially, teams can observe earlier results and adjust their play in the final match to achieve a pre-determined outcome.

  • Fewer Games, Higher Stakes: Each match in a three-team group carries more weight, making strategic play and collusion more tempting.
  • Sequential Play Advantage: Teams playing later can exploit the knowledge of earlier results, increasing the potential for manipulation.
  • Problematic Outcomes: A proportionally greater number of scenarios could arise where a draw or specific result benefits both teams at the expense of the third.
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Fair Play Across the Group

FIFA's guidance on the Russia 2018 group tie-breakers says fair-play conduct under Article 32(5)(g) is determined using all group matches. It is not calculated only from the matches in the group concerned. The guidance thus specifies a group-wide basis for this fair-play criterion.

Evidence Has Limits

The study on point-score systems says it cannot prove that real-world participants collude. It reports instead that its empirical findings provide circumstantial evidence consistent with collusion. The authors' qualification means the evidence they describe does not establish that participants actually colluded.

The Denmark–France Example

A tournament-design presentation identifies Denmark–France's 0–0 draw on June 26, 2018, as a recent example of tacit collusion in a three-team-group context. It says both teams knew a draw would let them reach the knockout stage regardless of the Australia–Peru result. Research on groups of three also notes that teams playing the final group match can know exactly what results will secure advancement.

One radical solution would be for FIFA to stage the entire tournament on a knockout basis. Though it would solve the collusion problem, it would also mean half the countries playing just one game. Given FIFA’s insistence on three-team groups, a more practical solution is needed.

A Simple Fix: Introducing Group Stage Penalty Shoot-Outs

Palacios-Huerta suggests introducing group stage penalty shoot-outs to eliminate draws. While simply awarding points for a shoot-out win isn't entirely fair, a refined approach can create a more equitable system. This system involves a modified points system to devalue drawn games and encourage decisive results.

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A 2026 Draw Under Scrutiny

A June 26, 2026 report describes allegations of collusion surrounding an Australia–Paraguay draw at the 2026 World Cup. It says the match led to a major controversy. The report frames the dispute as having an impact on the group stage, but the supplied account does not establish the allegation as fact.

Challenges Across Three Hosts

The Wilson Center describes coordinating hosting duties across three countries as a novel World Cup challenge. It says cooperation on security and cross-border travel could have been complicated by tensions between heads of state. The article points in particular to coinciding trade negotiations and contentious global summits as potential complications.

A FIFA-Linked Bribery Investigation

An Ethics Unwrapped account says the FBI and IRS coordinated with police agencies and diplomats in 33 countries to uncover an international bribery and kickbacks case. The account describes the case as widespread and linked to FIFA officials. Its description places the investigation in a cross-border law-enforcement context.

Under this system, a win in regulation time is worth 3 points for the winner and 0 for the loser. However, if a game ends in a draw, a penalty shoot-out determines the distribution of points: the winner of the shoot-out gets 2 points, and the loser gets 1 point. This 3-2-1-0 system creates more possible point combinations, which reduces the number of outcomes that might induce collusion.

By implementing this modified points system, FIFA can significantly reduce the potential for collusion in three-team groups, ensuring a fairer and more competitive World Cup for all participants. It’s a straightforward adjustment that addresses a complex problem, preserving the integrity and excitement of the beautiful game.

  • 0.0307 goals per minuteThe estimated scoring rate was 0.0307 goals per minute; the excerpt gives no comparison rate.[1]
  • 0.676In the modeled scenario where Japan chose to attack, its probability of qualifying was 0.676.[1]

What the Japan figures describe

The scoring-rate estimate and the attack-conditioned qualification probability describe different aspects of the same tactical scenario; neither can stand in for the other.[1]

The example shows how advancement could hinge on the margin of defeat, rather than simply on whether Japan lost.[1]

How the point-score evidence frames incentives

It identifies evenly matched teams as the setting in which the incentive to fix a match is strongest, adding a condition about team quality to the broader incentive explanation.[2]

The evidence is qualified: its authors say they cannot prove real-world collusion, and describe their empirical findings as circumstantial evidence consistent with it.[2]

What the incentive account leaves open

  • How would the cooperation incentive change when teams are not evenly matched, given that the account places its strongest fixing incentive among teams of equal quality?[2]

About this Article -

Written with AI assistance from published research, and reviewed by the Mystum team. See our About page for more information.

Everything You Need To Know

1

What is the central problem discussed?

The core issue involves the potential for collusion between teams, especially with the introduction of three-team groups, where strategic manipulation is more likely. The sequential nature of games in these groups allows teams to adjust their play based on earlier results, increasing the chances of pre-determined outcomes.

2

Why is the risk of collusion a concern?

The significance lies in the amplified risk of teams collaborating for mutually beneficial results, especially in three-team groups. This undermines fair play, potentially eliminating a team that would otherwise have advanced. The proposed changes could lead to strategically aimed results guaranteeing advancement for colluding parties, at the expense of a third team.

3

How can the issue of collusion be addressed?

A simple fix involves adjusting the scoring system, as proposed by Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Introducing group stage penalty shoot-outs to eliminate draws is one approach. A refined approach could create a more equitable system by devaluing drawn games and encouraging decisive results, reducing the incentive for collusion.

4

How does the current format compare to the proposed three-team group format regarding collusion?

The current four-team format already presents some opportunities for strategic manipulation, but the new structure significantly amplifies this risk. FIFA mitigates this in the current format by staging final group games simultaneously. With three-team groups, however, this becomes more challenging because matches will have to be played sequentially.

5

What is the impact of the three-team group format?

The introduction of three-team groups is a key element, as it creates more scenarios where collusion becomes a viable strategy. Fewer games in these groups mean each match carries more weight, and the sequential play gives teams the advantage of knowing earlier results. This increases the potential for manipulation and problematic outcomes.

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